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Abstract
Temporary migration, though empirically relevant, is often ignored
in formal models. This paper proposes a migration model with hetero-
geneous agents and persistent cross country income diﬀerentials that
features temporary migration. In equilibrium there exists a positive
relation between the stock of migrants and the income diﬀerential,
while the net migration ﬂow becomes zero. Consequently, existing
empirical migration models, estimating net migration ﬂows, instead of
stocks, may be misspeciﬁed. This suspicion appears to be conﬁrmed
by our investigation of the cointegration relationships of German
migration stocks and ﬂows since 1967. We ﬁnd that (i) panel-unit
root tests reject the hypothesis that migration ﬂows and the ex-
planatory variables are integrated of the same order, while migration
stocks and the explanatory variables are all I(1) variables, and (ii)
the hypothesis of cointegration cannot be rejected for the stock model.
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1 Introduction
Today’s international migration – opposed to that of the 19th century –
consists predominantly of temporary migrants, where an individuals’ stay
abroad may vary from a few months to several decades. Return migration
in Europe makes up almost 10 per cent of migration stocks p.a.,1 and micro
studies indicate that around 80 per cent of the migrants in Europe eventu-
ally return to their home countries (Dustmann, 1995; Karras and Chiswick,
1999). A central implication of migration being temporary is that each migra-
tion stream is associated with a compensating counter-stream, as Ravenstein
(1889) already observed in his famous ’Laws of Migration’ at the end of the
19th century.
Although often quoted, many of Ravenstein’s fundamental observations
have not been addressed systematically in the migration literature. Most
models in the classical migration literature treat migration as permanent.
Starting with the seminal contributions of Hill (1987) and Djajic and Mil-
bourne (1988) a number of models have analysed the phenomenon of tem-
porary migration, but these models usually ignore the heterogeneity of indi-
viduals. Consequently, even though migration is temporary, the same length
of migration episodes applies for all agents.2 There exist however striking
micro evidence that the length of migration episodes diﬀers largely across in-
dividuals depending on their human capital characteristics (Dustmann, 1995,
1See the evidence provided by OECD (2010) for a number of developed countries; for
Germany see StatistischesBundesamt (2010b).
2Hill (1987) and Djajic and Milbourne (1988) treat migration as an intertemporal
optimisation problem, where the length of migration is endogenously determined by host
and home wages and diﬀerences in utility between consumption abroad and at home. Yet
as they employ the concept of a representative agent all migration decisions (including
the length of stay) are identical for all agents. Building on these models, Dustmann and
Kirchkamp (2002) and Mesnard (2004) consider problems such as liquidity constraints,
diﬀerences in purchasing power parities across countries, and enhanced options for self-
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2003; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; Mesnard, 2004), although this evi-
dence is not considered by the underlying migration models. One exception
in the literature is the model of Stark (1995), which explains diﬀerences in
migration duration by asymmetric information concerning the human cap-
ital characteristics of high and low productivity migrants. After the true
type is revealed, low-productivity migrants are dismissed and return home,
accordingly displaying a shorter migration duration than high productivity
types.
This paper takes another route by considering heterogeneous preferences
of individuals with regard to the choice of location. The basic set-up of the
model is related to the standard model of temporary migration originally
developed by Djajic and Milbourne (1988), but departs in several aspects:
First, and most importantly, it is assumed that individuals discount con-
sumption in foreign countries by a certain factor, which varies across indi-
viduals.3 Even though not dealt with explicitly in the present paper, such
discount will be determined by the migration drivers and barriers identiﬁed
in the literature apart from income diﬀerences. For example it may increase
in the presence of ﬁxed migration costs (Grogger and Hanson, 2011), or fall
when an existing migrant population abroad creates beneﬁcial network ef-
fects (Beine, Docquier, and C ¸aglar ¨ Ozden, 2011). Second, in order to arrive
at analytical solutions for the case of heterogenous agents with individual
and endogenously determined length of migration spells, we have to employ
speciﬁc functional forms. Finally, the present model departs from Djajic and
Milbourne (1988) with respect to wage reactions to migration ﬂows. Ar-
guably, the traditional assumption where wage equalisation determines the
3Some other models in the literature consider heterogeneous preferences as well (Faini
and Venturini, 1995), but to the best of our knowledge the consequences of heterogeneous
preferences have not yet been analysed in the context of temporary migration.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 4
amount of migration in equilibrium appears to run counter to empirical evi-
dence. Actual migration is small relative to persistent cross-country income
diﬀerentials. Furthermore, institutional settings in Europe do limit wage
reactions in both the receiving and sending countries. Nevertheless migra-
tion stocks are relatively stable over time despite these large wage arbitrage
opportunities, this is for example the case within the EU and the European
Economic Area (EEA), where migration barriers have been largely abolished.
Based on these observations, equilibrium in the present model is not driven
by the wage equating forces of migration, but instead by the heterogeneity
of agents, which determines both the amount and duration of migration in
reaction to a given income diﬀerential.4
More speciﬁcally, at a given income diﬀerential the model generates three
types of individuals: stayers, i.e. those who stay at home and do not mi-
grate; temporary migrants, i.e. those who return home within their lifetime;
and permanent migrants, i.e. those who migrate for their entire lifetime.
Furthermore, within the group of temporary migrants, the duration of the
migration episode varies across individuals. Accordingly migration ﬂows and
stocks are composed of a variety of diﬀerent behaviors by agents. The av-
erage duration of migration episodes as well as the number of permanent
migrants tend to increase with an increasing income diﬀerential. The stock
of migrants, i.e. the share of the population which tends to stay abroad at a
certain point of time, increases with the income diﬀerential between the host
and the home country as well. Moreover, the net migration ﬂow is zero in
equilibrium. Gross migration ﬂows remain, however, a positive function of
the income diﬀerential.
These results have important implications for the estimation of macro
4Alternatively, the present analysis may be viewed as a partial equilibrium version of
more traditional set-ups.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 5
migration models: The standard macro models of migration, following the fa-
mous Harris and Todaro (1970) model, presume that an equilibrium between
net or gross migration ﬂows and the explanatory variables emerges. This tra-
dition has inspired until today the speciﬁcation of macro migration models,
which explain migration ﬂows by wage diﬀerentials, employment rates and
a number of institutional variables, see e.g. the seminal contributions by
Hatton (1995), Mayda (2010) and Pederson, Pytlikova, and Smith (2008).
In contrast our model implies that an equilibrium relationship between mi-
gration stocks and the explanatory variables arises in the long run, while net
ﬂows converge to zero even in case of large and persisting income diﬀerences
between countries. Accordingly, we test the hypothesis whether migration
stocks or ﬂows and the explanatory variables form a long-run equilibrium
in the empirical part of the paper, or, in technical terms, a cointegration
relationship.
Our analysis is based on migration to Germany from 51 source countries
during the period 1967-2009. Germany is not only after the US and Russia
the largest destination of migrants in the world in absolute terms, it is also
one of a few countries which provides time series on migration stocks and
ﬂows for more than four decades. Following the Engle and Granger (1987)
procedure, we test ﬁrst whether the variables of the stock or the ﬂow model
form a cointegrated set. To this end we apply panel unit-root and panel
cointegration tests, which increase the statistical power in comparison to
univariate unit-root and cointgration tests. We ﬁnd for our dataset at hand
that migration ﬂows are stationary variables while the explanatory variables
such as income and employment variables are integrated of the ﬁrst order
(I(1) variables). Thus the hypothesis of the traditional migration model in
the empirical literature that migration ﬂows and the explanatory variablesInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 6
form a cointegrated set is not supported by our data set. In contrast, we
provide evidence that migration stocks are I(1) as well. Moreover, our panel
cointegration tests rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration for most
speciﬁcations of our error correction model.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the for-
mal model of migration with heterogeneous agents. It derives the amount of
permanent and temporary migration as well as the individual and aggregate
duration of migration episodes and presents results for the implied migra-
tion stocks and ﬂows. Section 3 discusses the alternatives of ﬂow and stock
speciﬁcations for the estimation of macro migration models and applies then
panel unit-root and panel cointegration tests in order to prove whether the
variables of these alternative specﬁcations form a cointegrated set. On this
basis, Section 4 estimates the cointegrating vectors and the short-run dy-
namics of a migration stock model by employing an error correction model.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A migration model with heterogeneous
preferences
2.1 The model
Consider an economy where at each instant in time, t, there are N individuals
i born, endowed with one unit of labour each, and who each live for the same
period of time, Ti, normalised to 1, i.e. Ti = 1; 8 i = 1;:::;N. Each
individual is continuously employed throughout his or her life but has the
choice of staying abroad for a period i, where 0  i  1 8 i = 1;:::;N.
As in Djajic and Milbourne (1988), agents make and execute their migrationInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 7
decision at time ti = 0. In the foreign country, each domestic and migrant
worker receives the income level y∗, in the sending country the income level
is y, where y < y∗, i.e. outward migration only occurs from home to foreign
country.5 The utility ﬂows which individuals perceive from consumption














where ci and c∗
i are consumption at home and abroad, respectively,  (0 <
 < 1) is a parameter of the utility function, identical for all agents, and

i 2 [0;1] is a preference parameter, which is heterogenous across agents.
The parameter 
i captures the fact that individuals receive less utility
from consumption abroad than at home. The utility discount embedded in

i, may represent real or perceived cost of living abroad, include the ﬂow
equivalent of ﬁxed migration costs that migrant face in their migration deci-
sion (Beine, Docquier, and C ¸aglar ¨ Ozden, 2011), and may vary with the pres-
ence of other natives living abroad, i.e. network eﬀects (Grogger and Hanson,
2011). Although we do not explore these issues in the present model, in pass-
ing we note that diﬀerent distribution functions of gamma, and changes of
these distributions across time and destinations would be able capture these
and potential other drivers and determinants of migration decisions.
The utility functions in (1) and (2) display the feature that the marginal
utility enjoyed from the same rate of consumption is higher at home than
abroad, i.e. that u∗′(x) < u′(x), thus fulﬁll the conditions laid out in Djajic
and Milbourne (1988).6
5Variables with an asterisk denote throughout the Section values in the foreign country.
6As is usual in the literature, we interpret the condition that u∗′(x) < u′(x) to captureInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 8
The lifetime utility of a migrating individual returning to the home coun-






 + (1   i)c(t)
: (3)
The intertemporal maximisation problem of the individual is then
straightforward (Djajic and Milbourne, 1988): choose the duration of the
stay in the foreign country, i, and the rates of consumption over time abroad,
c∗
i(t), and at home, ci(t), such that lifetime utility (3) is maximised subject
to the budget constraint
iy
∗ + (1   i)y   ic
∗
i(t)   (1   i)ci(t)  0: (4)
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i(t)   ci(t) + y   y
∗) ; (7)
i (y
∗   y + ci(t)   c
∗
i(t)) = ci(t)   y: (8)
Since the shadow value of wealth, , is time-invariant, (5) and (6) imply that
c∗
i(t) = c∗
i and ci(t) = ci; 8 i = 1;:::;N, i.e. consumption at home and abroad
is constant over time. Moreover, equating the left-hand side of (5) and (6)
the fact that closer social relations to friends and relatives in the home country, a familiar
cultural environment and other factors associated with the home country result in a higher
utility for the same rate of consumption in the home country (Faini and Venturini, 1995).
7Notice that we ignore discounting by setting the discount factor implicitly to one.
Nevertheless, none of the results below depend on this assumption, see e.g. Dustmann
(2003), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), and Mesnard (2004) for a similar approach.






Thus consumption during the migrants stay abroad is a fraction of the con-
sumption upon his/her return to the home country. Next, from (9) and (7),








∗   y) ; (10)
i.e. consumption at home – and thus via (9) also consumption abroad – is a
linear function of the income diﬀerential.8










This optimal duration of migration displays the following reactions to changes
in the various parameters (see Appendix A.2). With respect to the income
levels, we ﬁnd that
@i
@y < 0 and
@i
@y > 0, thus an increase in foreign income,
a reduction in the domestic income and hence a widening of the income




i > 0, namely, individuals who have less of a
utility discount when consuming abroad display longer migration duration.
And the same follows for migration drivers and barriers that aﬀect 
i, for
example will positive migrant network eﬀects increase 
i and thus migration
spells.
Equations (9), (10) and (11) characterise the agents’ migration and con-
8Notice that the consumption patterns established in (10) and (9) also deﬁne the savings
path, e.g. s∗
i(t) = y∗   c∗
i for t = 0;:::;i.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 10
sumption behavior in the economy and are largely in line with results found
in the literature following Hill (1987) and Djajic and Milbourne (1988).9 On
this basis, we are now equipped to explore the consequences of agent hetero-
geneity for aggregated migration patterns.
2.2 Results
Given the above model we can derive results concerning agent heterogeneity,
migration decisions and migration ﬂows and stocks.
Permanent and temporary migrants and stayers
The optimal value of i given in (11) may well be larger than an agent’s total
lifetime, Ti = 1. This becomes more likely for very high 
i, an individual
with a small utility discount when living abroad, or for  close to 1 or for a
very large income gap y∗  y. In fact, what a i  1 implies is that an agent
becomes a permanent migrant: the utility value of living and consuming
abroad is so large that given the higher income level in the foreign country,
returning – even in the last instant of life – creates no additional value. Deﬁne
by ¯ 
 the individual who is indiﬀerent to the question of returning (temporary
migration) vs. staying abroad forever (permanent migration). Solving i = 1
from (11) for 
 gives the ﬁrst result:
Lemma 1. The group of permanent migrants consists of all individuals i
with






9One important diﬀerence does exist, however: Djajic and Milbourne (1988) ﬁnd an
ambiguous eﬀect of foreign income on the migration duration, since a higher income might
result in an earlier return to the home country if the utility function is characterised by a
low rate of substitution. This case is excluded here through the speciﬁc functional form
of utility.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 11
Solving for the consumption volume of a permanent migrant from (9)
and (10) after setting 
i = ¯ 
, one can verify that c∗
i = y∗, i.e. permanent




@y < 0, such that an increase in the foreign income level –
or an increase in the income gap – lowers the threshold value of 
i, beyond
which individuals become permanent migrants.
At the other end of the spectrum, we have those agents who prefer to
stay at home instead of migrating. Deﬁne by 
 the individual who is com-
pletely indiﬀerent to the question of migrating vs. staying at home, i.e. the
individual whose optimal migration duration is i = 0. Solving i = 0 from
(11) for 
 gives:









i 2 [0;1], a necessary condition for at least one individual in the
sense of lemma 2 to exist is that y∗ < y=. if this condition is violated,
then the income gap is so substantial, that all all individuals of the sending
country would migrate. For the sake of realism it is assumed that y∗ < y=
is fulﬁlled in the remainder of the Section. Notice that
@

@y < 0, such that
an increase in the foreign income level lowers the threshold value 
, implying
that fewer agents are stayers.
It is easy to verify that ¯ 
 in (12) is always larger than 
 in (13) as long
as the income gap y∗   y is positive. Accordingly, there exists a third group
of agents that maximise utility with a i 2]0;1[, i.e. individuals who spend
part of their working lives abroad and part at home – temporary migrants.
Following the reasoning above, temporary migrants are characterised as fol-
lows:International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 12





Thus, the above results establish that within the population of the home
country, three types of agents can be distinguished. While all permanent mi-
grants display identical consumption and migration durations – as do stayers
– the group of temporary migrants features varying durations of migration
spells. Figure 1 plots the qualities implied by the optimal migration duration








 –stayer– –temporary– –permanent–
Figure 1: The duration of migration spells for diﬀerent agents
The aggregate duration of migration
In order to analyse aggregate eﬀects, the distribution of 
i’s in the population
must be speciﬁed. Here we assume the 
i’s in each cohort to be uniformlyInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 13
distributed on support [0,1]. Accordingly the area under the curve in Figure
1 represents the aggregate duration of all migration spells for a cohort. While
i is by deﬁnition zero for stayers and one for permanent migrants, Figure
1 shows that the migration duration is monotonically increasing in 
 in the
interval between ¯ 
 and 
.
Integrating (11) over the interval 
 to ¯ 
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The resulting t captures the total migration duration of all temporary
migrants of a cohort, thus in eﬀect both the number of temporary migrants
as well as their individual migration durations are captured. As one would
intuitively expect, it can be shown that @t
@y > 0, i.e. an increase in for-
eign income levels has an unambiguously positive eﬀect on the duration of
aggregated temporary migration.
Next, under the assumption of uniformly distributed 
i’s, the duration of
aggregated permanent migration of a cohort simply becomes






Finally, the number of stayers – and since Ti = 1 also their aggregate




Combining (14) and (15), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. The aggregate duration of migration, , from a single cohort
is
 = N ln
(
y∗   y
y (1   )
)
; (16)International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 14
 increases in the foreign income level, @
@y > 0, and
 falls in the domestic income level, @
@y < 0
Equation (16) arrives at a surprisingly simple speciﬁcation of the total
duration of time spent abroad by the migrants in a given cohort. Lemma
1, 2 and 3 and proposition 1 have clear implications for migration stocks,
migration ﬂows and their interaction.
Migration 
ows and migration stocks
Moving from the migration decisions and durations in a single cohort to
migration stocks, one has to specify the number of cohorts coexisting at
any instant in time. Let L denote this number. Assuming zero population
growth – that is a rate of reproduction of 1 – then the total population at
any point in time is LN. Furthermore, assume that each cohort is identical
to the previous including their consumption and migration decisions but that
descendants’ 
i’s are uncorrelated to their parents 
i’s and that reproduction
takes place at the end of an agents lifetime.10 This leads to the following
results:
Proposition 2. The population stocks at every instant in time are



















10This last assumption implies that temporary migrants give birth after they returned
to the home country, while only permanent migrants give birth abroad.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 15







d) total stock of home population: H = NL   S(t)
= NL
(






Proof (sketch): Proposition 2 a) is the aggregate of all permanent migrants
in one cohort times the number of cohorts coexisting at every point in time.
Since we have normalized the agent’s lifetime to one, this turns out to be
Sp = Lp. Proposition 2 b) is the average duration of the migration spell of
a temporary migrant, t
N( 
−
) times the total number of temporary migrants
coexisting at every instant in time, LN(¯ 
   
). It follows that St(t) =
Lt. Finally, proposition 2 c) follows from a) and b) and thus S = L, and
proposition 2 d) follows from c). Thus the stock of migrants is here a fairly
simple logarithmic relation of the income gap.











Figure 2: Migration stocks and stock of home populationInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 16
To see what the relations derived in proposition 2 imply consider Figure 2.
Figure 2 plots the stock of temporary, permanent, and total migration as well
as the stock of home population as a function of foreign income, y∗. For the
actual plot, the following parameter values are employed: y = 100,  = 0:3,
N = 1000 and L = 100. At y∗ = 100 there is no income gap and accordingly
all agents spend all their working life at home. As the income gap widens,
there are initially a few individuals who opt for permanent migration and a
few who opt for temporary migration. However, since the income diﬀerential
is small, the actual amount of time spent abroad is small too. Accordingly
from the perspective of the aggregate migration stock, temporary migration
contributes relatively little to total migration compared to permanent migra-
tion since permanent migrants spend their entire lifetimes abroad. As the
income gap widens, the role of temporary migration increases while that of
permanent migration decreases.
Finally, consider the migration ﬂows associated with the above stocks, in
particular measuring ﬂows occurring during any time interval of length 1.
Given that reproduction takes place at the end of an agents life, the number
of birth abroad occurring over the time interval 1 are LN(1 ¯ 
) (= Sp) while
LN¯ 
 birth take place at home, i.e. the entire population has been renewed,
however part of any descendant generation are born abroad by migrants.
Proposition 3. Migration ﬂows over any time interval of length 1 are
a) gross emigration: Me = LN¯ 










y(y−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d) net migration: M = Me   Mr;h   Mr;f = 0
Proof (sketch): Since all individuals that migrate do so at time ti = 0,
proposition 3 a) is simply the sum of all home born (LN¯ 
) temporary and
permanent migrants. Proposition 3 b) follows from the fact that all cohorts
behave identically, such that in equilibrium for every home born temporary
outmigrant there is a matching temporary return migrant born in one of the
previous cohorts. The return ﬂow of foreign born agents in proposition 3
c) is composed of the share of stayers and temporary migrants (¯ 
) in the
total foreign born population (LN(1   ¯ 
)); or put diﬀerently, except for
those agents that decide to be permanent migrants all other foreign born
individuals will return at some point in time during their life to the home
land. Proposition 3 d) follows from a), b) and c).
That the net ﬂow of migrants associated with a given income diﬀerential
and equilibrium stocks turns out to be zero is driven by the assumption that
reproduction takes place at the end of an agents life time. If instead, one
assumed that reproduction takes place earlier in an agents life, then some of
the temporary migrants would reproduce while staying abroad generating an
additional – and unmatched – ﬂow of return migrants that results in negative
net migration.
Figure 3 plots the migration ﬂows given in proposition 3, for various levels
of foreign income, when y = 100,  = 0:3, N = 1000 and L = 100.
Corollary 1. All migration stocks Sp, St and S and the migration ﬂows Me,
Mr;h and Mr;f are positive and increasing in the income diﬀerential y∗   y.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 18








Figure 3: Migration ﬂows in equilibrium
The net migration ﬂow M is zero and independent of the income diﬀerential
y∗   y.
3 Stock vs. 
ow models
The above results and particular Corollary 1 have important consequences
for the empirical estimation of macro migration models. It follows from our
model that an equilibrium relationship between the income diﬀerential and
migration stocks instead of net ﬂows emerges in equilibrium. A positive
net migration ﬂow can only occur during the transition to a steady state.11
Yet, most macro migration models in the empirical literature to date state
explicitly or implicitly that an equilibrium between migration ﬂows and ex-
11Notice that this reasoning abstracts from diﬀerences in population growth rates among
the migrant and the home population and other aspects such as the assimilation and
naturalisation of migrants.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 19
planatory variables such as the income diﬀerential exists, see e.g. the seminal
contributions by Hatton (1995), Mayda (2010), and Pederson, Pytlikova, and
Smith (2008). With the notable exception of (Hatton, 1995) this literature
does not consider the time-series properties of the data.
In contrast, we examine the competing hypotheses that an equilibrium
between the explanatory variables and migration stocks or migration ﬂows
exists empirically within a cointegration framework here. The concept of
cointegration is closely related to the notion of equilibrium: a cointegration
relationship between variables implies that economic forces drive the system
towards the equilibrium deﬁned by the long-run relationship posited (Engle
and Granger, 1987). When considering long-run relationships, it becomes
necessary to consider the underlying properties of the processes that generate
time series variables. If variables follow diﬀerent stochastic processes over
time, spurious regression results can arise that suggest statistically signiﬁcant
long-run relationships between variables, when in fact this is merely evidence
of contemporaneous correlations rather than meaningful causal relationships
(Granger and Newbold, 1974).
Following the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure, we ﬁrst test for both
the stock and the ﬂow model whether the dependent and the explanatory
variables are integrated of the same order, and, if this is the case, whether the
null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected by our data at hand. We apply
panel unit-root and panel cointegration tests, which increases the statistical
power of the tests signiﬁcantly in comparison to tests based on individual
time series. Given a relatively short time dimension in our data set, we
use in the ﬁnal step an error correction speciﬁcation for the estimation of
the cointegrating vectors and the short-run dynamics. Based on this error
correction speciﬁcation we apply the test by Westerlund (2007) for drawingInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 20
inference on panel cointegration.
3.1 Two alternative specications











where mst is deﬁned as the share of the migration stock in the total popula-
tion of the sending country, i.e. mst  S=(LN). For empirical purposes, one
can approximate the expression for mst by






which allows interpreting the estimated parameters as elasticities. We follow
furthermore Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) in assuming that
income levels are conditioned by employment opportunities in the respective
locations. More speciﬁcally, if jobs are allocated in each period randomly
among the workforce, we can write expected income as the wage times the
employment rate, i.e. as w  e. If individuals are risk averse and uncer-
tainty focusses on employment opportunities, it can be expected that the
coeﬃcients for the employment variables are larger than those for the wage
variables (Hatton, 1995). Moreover, since employment opportunities of mi-
grants in host countries are below those of natives, the coeﬃcient for the
employment rate in the host country is larger than that in the source coun-
try. Finally, if capital markets are not perfect, liquidity constraints aﬀect
migration decisions. Consequently, for a given income diﬀerence between the
host and the home country, the income level in the source country has aInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 21
positive impact on migration (Faini and Venturini, 1995).
Based on these considerations we derive the following parsimonious spec-
iﬁcation for the long-run migration function:
lnmstit = a0 + a1 ln
wft
wit
+ a2 lnwit + a3 lneft + a4 lneit + 
′xfit + it; (17)
where mstit denotes the migration stock as a percentage of the population
in sending country i, wft the wage rate in the host country, wit the wage
rate in the home country i, eft the employment rate in the host country,
eit the employment rate in the home country i, xfit a vector of variables
which cover migration restrictions and other push and pull factors relevant
for migration between sending country i and destination f, and it is the
error term. The error term is speciﬁed as a one-way error component model
(Hsiao, 1986), i.e. as it = i + "it, where i is a country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀect and "it is white noise. Note that the country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
cover all time invariant factors relevant for migration such as geographical
distance, language proximity and long-term historical ties such as colonial
links. Note that Br¨ ucker and Siliverstovs (2006) have proved that simple ﬁxed
eﬀects estimators outperform heterogeneous and other more sophisticated
estimators in the context of international migration. Finally, i = 1;:::;N and
t = 1;:::;T denote the source country and time indices and f the destination
country (Germany).
Compare this to the standard ﬂow model of international migration. The
ﬂow equation in the empirical literature has the following form, see e.g. Hat-
ton (1995), Mayda (2010) and Pederson, Pytlikova, and Smith (2008):
lnmit = b0 + b1 ln
wft
wit
+ b2 lnwit + b3 lneft + b4 lneit (18)
+ b5 lnmstit + 
′xfit + it;International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 22
where mit denotes the net (gross) migration rate as a percentage of the
population in sending country i. The existing stock of migrants is included
on the right hand side of the model as a proxy for ’social network’ eﬀects
which are expected to increase the propensity to migrate by alleviating the
adaptation costs in the host country, see Hugo (1981), Massey and Espana
(1987), Massey (1990a), Massey (1990b) and Bauer (1995).12
The estimation of the migration functions in equations (17) and (18) can
be aﬀected by spurious correlation eﬀects if the regressions involve variables
that follow an I(1) or other non-stationary process (see the seminal paper
by Granger and Newbold (1974)). The notable exception is the situation
when I(1) dependent and explanatory variables form a cointegration set,
see Engle and Granger (1987). While there is a general agreement that
macroeconomic variables such as income levels and employment rates are
rather well represented as I(1) processes, there is still limited evidence on
the time series properties of the migration ﬂows and corresponding migrant
stock variables.13
Particularly puzzling is the fact that the migration ﬂow and the migration
stock variable are included in equation (18). Since migration ﬂows can be
conceived as (almost) the ﬁrst diﬀerence of migration stocks, they can hardly
be I(1) variables if migration stocks are supposed to be I(1) variables as well.
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the migration ﬂow variable is better
approximated by an I(0) process if migration stocks are I(1). In this case it
12Of course, there exist more possible macro models of migration. Beyond the logarith-
mic functional form semi-logarithmic functions are also common in the literature (Hatton,
1995). Furthermore, some models use also measures for the inequality of earnings and
further explanatory variables.
13There are few exceptions in the literature: Hatton (1995) provides empirical evidence
that all variables in equation (18) are I(1) for UK-US migration from 1870 to 1913, but it is
unclear whether this is also supported by other data sets. Br¨ ucker, Fachin, and Venturini
(2011) and Fachin (2007) present mixed evidence for internal migration in Italy, while the
ﬁndings of Br¨ ucker (2002) suggest that migration stocks in Germany contain a unit-root.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 23
is suitable to use the stock model in equation (17) for estimating the long-run
migration function.
3.2 Data
A cointegration analysis of the economic forces which drive international
migration requires large time series of migration data. We use data from
Germany, which is after the US and Russia the most important destination
of migrants in the world in absolute terms. Migration stock and ﬂow data by
country of origin exist in Germany since 1967. Our data set covers the period
1967 to 2009, which gives 43 time series observations. We include 51 sending
countries for which continuous time series were available. We distinguish a
European and a non-European sample here. The European sample consists
of 24 countries, i.e. the remaining 14 countries of the ﬁfteen Member States
of the European Union before 2004, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Bulgaria,
the (former) Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the (former) USSR
and the (former) Yugoslavia. For getting long-time series, we have aggregated
the ﬁgures from the successor states of the former Czechoslovakia, USSR
and Yugoslavia. The non-European sample contains Australia, the USA and
Japan, 9 countries from the Middle East and Northern Africa, 9 countries
from Asia (incl. China and India) and 5 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa.
The data on migration stocks and ﬂows come from the German Fed-
eral Statistical Oﬃce (StatistischesBundesamt, 2010a,b). For the stock of
migrants, we use foreign residents as reported by the Central Register of
Foreigners (’Ausl¨ anderzentralregister’) as a variable.14 The stock of foreign
residents is reported on December 31 of each year (in some early years on
14Note that all residents of Germany are obliged to register their place of residence. The
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September 30).15 The number of foreign residents is slightly overstated by
the Central Register of Foreigners, since return migration is not completely
registered by the municipalities. Consequently, the ﬁgures for the stock of
foreign residents has been revised following population censuses in 1972, 1987
and 2004. We include dummy variables which control for these breaks in the
regressions if they appear signiﬁcant.
The data on migration ﬂows stem again from the central register of for-
eigners. We consider three ﬂow variables: net migration ﬂows, mit, gross
inﬂows, imit, and gross return ﬂows, outit. The migration stock and ﬂow
variables are normalised by the population of the home countries, i.e. they
are calculated as a percentage of the corresponding home population.
Population ﬁgures are depicted from the World Development Indicators
2010 (World Bank, 2010). Missing data has been complemented by OECD
(2010) and sending country sources. As a proxy for wages and other in-
comes, the historical series of GDP per worker in purchasing power parities
from the Penn World Tables 6.3 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009) have
been used and extrapolated by the growth rates from similar series in the
World Development Indicators 2010. The employment rate is deﬁned as 100
minus the unemployment rate in per cent. Unemployment rates have been
15It is sometimes argued that natural population growth and naturalisations distort the
migration stock variable. By deﬁnition, the increase of the stock of foreign residents equals
net immigration plus natural population growth minus the number of naturalisations plus
reporting errors for a given period of time. Since our migration variables are calculated
as rates, natural population growth cancels out if the rate of natural population growth
of migrants equals the rate of natural population growth in the home countries. Thus, if
natural population growth of the migrant population in Germany and the source country
is similar and the rate of naturalisations is low, the annual increase of the stock of foreign
residents as a share in the home population equals almost annual net immigration. Indeed,
the annual increase of migration stocks as a share of home population almost equals
net immigration rates in our sample. The German migration legislation has eased the
naturalisation of immigrants in 1999. As a robustness check, we included a dummy variable
which has a value of 1 from 1999 onwards and zero otherwise, which however did not turn
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taken from the OECD Stat database (OECD, 2010) and complemented by
the World Development Indicators 2010. The ILO deﬁnition has been used
for all unemployment rates. Particularly in the non-European sample, only
few countries report complete (un-)employment series. Considering the send-
ing countries’ employment rate reduces thus our sample from 2193 to 1379
observations. In our standard speciﬁcation, we do therefore not consider the
sending countries’ employment rate.
Institutions and other push and pull factors aﬀect migration decisions
in one way or another. We consider therefore in addition to our basic eco-
nomic variables the following dummy variables: A free movement dummy
(FREEit), which has a value of 1 if the rules of free movement within the Eu-
ropean Union and European Economic Area apply for country i and of zero
if otherwise, a dummy which covers the emigration restrictions in the former
Eastern bloc (IRONit), a dummy for dictatorship in country i (DICTit)
which has been derived from the Freedom House political rights index, a
dummy for civil and other wars in sending country i, and ﬁnally a dummy
variable which covers the change of asylum legislation in Germany which
became eﬀective in the year 1992 (ASY Lft).
The list of variables and the descriptive statistics are presented in Annex
Tables A1 and A2.
3.3 Testing for unit roots
In the ﬁrst step of the empirical analysis, the variables are tested for unit-
roots for drawing inference on the order of integration. To this end, we apply
the panel-unit root test suggested by Breitung (2000). The null hypothesis
is that all panels contain a unit-root and the alternative that all series are
stationary. Although the Breitung (2000) test assumes that all panels haveInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 26
a common autoregressive parameter, Breitung and Das (2005) provide ev-
idence that the test also has considerable power in the heterogeneous case
where each panel is allowed to have its own autoregressive parameter. Monte
Carlo simulations suggest that the test is substantially more powerful than
other panel unit-root tests for data sets of modest size. Importantly, there
is an option for the Breitung (2000) test which is robust for cross-sectional
correlation of the error terms. This statistic has an asymptotically normal
distribution when ﬁrst the time dimension tends to inﬁnity followed by the
group dimension tending to inﬁnity.
The cross-sectional correlation robust version of the Breitung (2000) test
requires that T > N, which is not the case in our total sample with 51
countries and 43 time periods. We apply therefore ﬁrst the non-robust version
of the panel unit-root test to the total sample. Following Levin, Lin, and Chu
(2002) we subtracted the mean of the series across panels from the series in
order to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional dependence. In the European
and the non-European samples, where the group dimension is smaller than
the time dimension of the panel, we used the version of the panel unit-root
test which is robust to cross-sectional correlation of the error terms.16
The Breitung (2000) test requests that the panel is strictly balanced.
That holds for all variables except for the employment rate in the sending
countries. For this variable we applied the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003)
(IPS-test) for panel unit-roots. This tests allows each panel to have its own
autoregressive parameter and does not require that the data are strongly
balanced. The null hypothesis is that all panels have a unit-root. The alter-
native hypothesis is that the fraction of panels that are stationary is nonzero.
We report the ¯ z~ t-statistics, which assumes that the group dimension tends to
16Our ﬁndings turn out to be robust also in other compositions of the sample not
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inﬁnity. Finally, for the employment rate in Germany, a standard Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used.
Table 1 about here
Table 1 present the results of the unit-root tests performed on the host-
and home-country-speciﬁc economic variables. As expected, the null hy-
pothesis that the time-series of the macroeconomic variables, i.e. the ratio
of the GDP per worker, the GDP per worker in the sending country17 and
the employment rates contain a unit-root, is not rejected by the panel unit
root tests. In contrast, for the ﬁrst diﬀerence of these variables, the null hy-
pothesis of a unit-root is rejected at the 1%-level in all panel unit-root tests.
While the ADF-test suggests that the German employment variable contains
a unit-root if we do not consider a trend variable, the test results indicate
that this variable might be trend-stationary. However, since a deterministic
time trend in the evolution (un-)employment rates does not make sense for
a priori reasons, we think that the latter result is not relevant for our further
investigation.
For the migration stock variable, the panel unit-root tests do not reject
the null hypothesis of a unit-root, while this hypothesis is rejected for the net
migration rate. Note that we cannot test the net migration rate in logarithmic
form, since there are many negative observations. The results for the gross
immigration and the gross return migration rates are mixed: While the null
of a unit-root is rejected for the gross immigration rate in the total sample
17Note that the unit-root tests obtain the same results for the ratio of the income
variables and for the income variables in the sending countries since the means of the series
across panels are subtracted in order to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional dependence.
We report the results only for completeness.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 28
and the non-European sample, it is not rejected in the European sample.
The null of a unit-root is not rejected for the return migration rate in the
total and the European sample, but rejected in the non-European sample.
Thus, we can conclude from the panel unit-root tests that the assump-
tion of the standard migration model, i.e. that net migration ﬂows on the
one hand, and macroeconomic variables such as GDP per worker levels or
employment rates on the other hand, are integrated of the same order, is
not supported by the data set employed here. As a consequence, the net
ﬂow variable and the explanatory variables cannot form a cointegrated set.
However, we ﬁnd strong evidence that the migration stock and the explana-
tory variables are I(0) variables. The evidence for the gross immigration and
return variables is mixed, such that we cannot draw a clear-cut conclusion
here. Note that our theoretical model predicts that the gross immigration
and return migration rates are a fraction of the migration stock in equilib-
rium, such that they might be cointegrated with the explanatory variables
similar to the migration stock variable. However, empirically we ﬁnd only
mixed evidence that the data-generating processes of the gross ﬂow and the
explanatory variables have the same stochastic properties, such that we do
not consider the gross ﬂow variables in the estimation of the cointegration
vectors.
3.4 Testing for panel cointegration
In the next step we test whether the migration stock and the explanatory
variables indeed form a cointegrated set. To this end we apply the apply the
procedure suggested by Westerlund (2007), which tests the null hypothesis
of no cointegration by determining whether the individual panel members
are error correcting. The tests are very ﬂexible and allow for an almostInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 29
completely heterogeneous speciﬁcation of both the long- and short-run parts
of the error-correction model, where the latter can be determined from the
data. The series are allowed to be of unequal length.
Table 2 displays the group mean statistics, G-, and the panel P-
statistics. The group-mean statistics start from a weighted average of the
individually estimated error correction parameters and their t-statistics, re-
spectively. It tests the null hypothesis that the error correction parameter
is zero for all i versus the alternative that the error correction parameter is
smaller than zero for at least one group i. The panel P test statistics pool
the information over the cross-sectional units to test the null hypothesis that
error correction parameter is zero for all i versus the alternative hypothesis
that it is smaller than zero for all i. Thus, a failure to reject the null hypoth-
esis should be taken as a failure to reject the null of no cointegration for the
panel as a whole in the latter case.
We test two models for cointegration: The ﬁrst model explains the mi-
gration stock by the ratio of the GDP per worker, the GDP per worker
in the sending country and the employment rate in Germany. The second
model includes also the employment rate of the sending countries. Note that
the second model is an unbalanced panel. The lag structure of the error
correction model is chosen by the Akaike information criteria. We consider
between 1 and 3 lags of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the variables in the balanced
panel model, in the unbalanced panel we were only able to consider one lag.
Table 2 about here
In the balanced panel, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected
both by the group mean and the panel statistics in the total sample and inInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 30
the European sample. While the group mean statistics fails to reject the null
of no cointegration in the non-European sample, the panel cointegration test
statistics rejects the null of no cointegration for the panel as a whole. In the
unbalanced panel, the picture is more mixed: While the panel cointegration
test statistics rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration for the total
and the European sample, the group mean statistics rejects the null of no
cointegration only in the European sample.
Thus, the results of the cointegration tests suggest that we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the variables of the stock model form a cointegrated set
in the balanced panel, although we have to take this ﬁnding with a grain of
salt for the non-European countries where migration episodes ﬂuctuate more
over time than in the European context. However, if we include employment
rates of the sending countries, our results turn out to be much weaker. This
might be also traced back to the fact that the panel is not balanced any more
and that we lose particularly in the non-European sample many time-series
observations.
4 Estimation results
There are diﬀerent procedures for estimating both the long-run cointegra-
tion relationship and the short-run dynamics. If the variables form a cointe-
grated set, the cointegrating vector can be consistently estimated in a static
regression which completely omits the dynamics of the model (Engle and
Granger, 1987). Although the famous super-consistency result (Stock, 1987)
indicates that convergence is rather fast, the asymptotic distribution of the
least squares estimator and the associated t-statistics is non-normal in ﬁnite
samples. Moreover, an unadressed ’endogeneity bias’ invalidates standardInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 31
hypothesis testing in samples of ﬁnite size.18 Monte-Carlo evidence suggests
that the estimation bias of the cointegrating parameter is smaller in dynamic
than in static models (Banerjee, Dolado, Henry, and Smith, 1986). The em-
pirical equation is therefore speciﬁed here in form of an error correction model
(ECM), which allows estimation of both the long-term cointegrating vector
and the short-run dynamics. Note that the ECM has a ﬂexible functional
form and imposes few restrictions on the adjustment process.
Speciﬁcally, the estimation model has the form
∆lnmstit = 1 lnmsti;t−1 + 2 ln
wf;t−1
wi;t−1
+ 3 lnwi;t−1 + 4 lnef;t−1 + (19)
5 lnei;t−1 + 6∆ln
wft
wit
+ 7∆lnwit + 8∆lneft +





i = i=   1 is the long-run value for the country-speciﬁc eﬀect,
∆ the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator, zit a vector of institutional variables and 
the corresponding vector of coeﬃcients. As outlined above, we use dummy
variables which should capture institutions and push and pull factors such as
dictatorship and wars aﬀecting migration incentives and opportunities. Note
that the adjustment parameter of the ECM is given by -1, and that the long-
term coeﬃcients of the cointegrating relationship are given by -k/1, where
k = 2;3:::5. Further lags of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the dependent variable and
lags of ﬁrst diﬀerences of the explanatory variables have not been considered
in this speciﬁcation of the ECM since they appear not signiﬁcant.
The estimation results of the short-run semi-elasticities of the dynamic
model are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The model is estimated with a
standard ﬁxed eﬀects (within) model (FE) using the log of the population
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size as a weight. The results of the F-test show that the country-speciﬁc
eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 1%-level in all regressions.
Table 3 about here
Table 3 presents the results for the total sample. We have estimated
three models: The ﬁrst model considers the ratio of the GDP per worker,
the GDP per worker in the sending country and the German employment
rate as explanatory variables. The second model considers also the dummy
variables for institutions and other push and pull factors. Finally, the third
model includes the employment rate of the sending countries in addition.
In all three regressions the coeﬃcient of the lagged migration stock vari-
able is signiﬁcantly negative, which assures the dynamic stability of the
model. However, the coeﬃcient on the lagged ﬁrst diﬀerence of the mi-
gration stock has a value of about 0.5 and is highly signiﬁcant, which might
be interpreted as a hint that ’chain’ or ’herd’ eﬀects (Epstein and Hillman,
1998) play an important role in the short-term – although they do not aﬀect
the dynamic stability of the system in the long-run.
All coeﬃcients on the economic variables have the expected signs and
appear highly signiﬁcant: Both the log diﬀerence of the GDP per worker
and the GDP per worker in the sending countries exert a positive and highly
signiﬁcant impact on migration stocks. While the ﬁrst ﬁnding suggests that
income diﬀerences have a substantial impact on migration, the latter one
suggests that tends to increase with the income level in the sending coun-
tries at a given income diﬀerence. This supports previous ﬁndings in the
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for migration decisions (Faini and Venturini, 1995). The German employ-
ment rate is highly signiﬁcant indicating that employment opportunities in
the destination countries have a substantial impact on migration. Finally,
the employment rate in the sending countries has the expected negative co-
eﬃcient and appears highly signiﬁcant as well. However, this parameter has
a much smaller value than the employment rate in the receiving country.
Note that many empirical studies ﬁnd that home employment opportunities
have been insigniﬁcant or have actually increased migration (see Greenwood
(1975) for a review). Our results here do not conﬁrm these ﬁndings, but they
do show that home employment has a much weaker impact than employment
in the receiving countries. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is
that favorable employment opportunities in home countries might have am-
biguous eﬀects on migration, since higher employment rates reduce incentives
to seek employment abroad on the one hand, while on the other they help to
lift liquidity constraints that potential migrants face, and in doing so, may
encourage migration.
The institutional variables have the expected signs in all regressions, but
we observe substantial diﬀerences in the size of the parameters and their
signiﬁcance. The coeﬃcient of the free movement dummy is only signiﬁcant
in the balanced panel, while it appears insigniﬁcant in the regression which
considers the unemployment rate of the sending countries. Not surprisingly,
the negative coeﬃcient on the iron curtain dummy indicates that the emigra-
tion restrictions in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc have eﬀectively
hindered migration from there to Germany. The dictatorship and the war
dummies have the expected signs, but are not signiﬁcant in both speciﬁ-
cations of the model. However, the restrictions on asylum which became
eﬀective in 1992 have signiﬁcantly hindered migration to Germany.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 34
Table 4 about here
Our ﬁndings from the European- and the non-European samples conﬁrm
this picture: In all regressions the negative coeﬃcient on the lagged migra-
tion stock indicates that the model is stable from a dynamic perspective.
However, the large and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
the migration stock variables suggests that the chain- or network eﬀects play
an important role. Interestingly enough, the coeﬃcient on the income ratio
is not only highly signiﬁcant in both samples, it also has a similar size. How-
ever, the size of the coeﬃcient on the income variable in the sending countries
is larger in the non-European sample suggesting that liquidity constraints are
more important there than in the European sample. The German employ-
ment rate exerts a large and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on migration stocks in
all four regressions. The employment rate of the sending countries aﬀects
migration stocks negatively, but the size of the coeﬃcient is much smaller
compared to that of the employment rate in Germany. The coeﬃcients of
the institutional variables have the expected signs, but appear not always
signiﬁcant: As an example, the free movement dummy is not signiﬁcant at
all, while the iron curtain dummy appears only signiﬁcant in the balanced
dummy which does not consider the sending countries’ employment rate. In
contrast, the dictatorship, war and asylum dummies appear signiﬁcant in
the ﬁrst three regressions. Note that the last regression is based only on a
limited number of observations, since many non-European countries do not
report their employment rates.
All together, our regression results tend to conﬁrm our theoretical ex-
pectations and particularly the economic variables appear signiﬁcant in allInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 35
regressions. Moreover, the size of the coeﬃcients is also relatively homo-
geneous in most regressions which supports the application of the standard
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator with uniform slope coeﬃcients as suggested by Br¨ ucker
and Siliverstovs (2006).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the macro determinants of migration both from
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The model presented in the theo-
retical part establishes a long-run equilibrium, in which individuals can stay
their entire life in the home country, migrate temporarily abroad – with in-
dividual durations of migration spells – or stay permanently in a foreign
country depending on their preferences. This model generated insights in
the mechanics of migration stocks and ﬂows. The number of migrants, the
duration of migration spells and therewith the stock of migrants all increases
with the income diﬀerence between the host and the home country, while net
migration ceases to zero. The gross emigration and return migration rates
are related to the stocks of permanent and temporary migrants. Since the
stock of permanent and temporary migrants and are a positive function of
the income diﬀerential. Consequently, existing empirical migration models,
estimating net migration ﬂows, instead of stocks, may be misspeciﬁed.
In the empirical part of the paper the determinants of international mi-
gration have been analysed within a cointegration framework. The method-
ological aspects of the analysis can be summarised as follows: ﬁrst, the results
of the panel unit-root and panel cointegration test suggest that the standard
net ﬂow migration model is misspeciﬁed – at least for the data set used here.
The traditional migration model in the empirical model explains migrationInternational Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 36
ﬂows by a number of explanatory variables such as GDP per capita, (un-
)employment rates, (lagged) migration stocks and institutional variables. It
is widely acknowledged in the literature that macroeconomic variables such
as GDP and employment are non-stationary variables, or, more speciﬁcally,
I(1) variables. The existence of a long-run equilibrium between migration
ﬂows and the traditional set of macroeconomic variables requires therefore
that migration ﬂows are I(1) as well. The tests carried out in the empirical
part of this paper, however, indicate that migration rates are stationary, while
migration stocks are I(1) variables. Moreover, our test results reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration for most speciﬁcations of our error correction
model. This can be interpreted as empirical support for the theoretical hy-
pothesis that migration stocks and explanatory variables such as the income
diﬀerential and employment variables form an equilibrium relationship.
Our ﬁndings have some important policy consequences. The ﬂow model
suggests that migration does not stop before expected income levels between
host and source countries have converged to a certain threshold level, which
is determined by the costs of migration. In case of persistent diﬀerences in
expected income levels, either the total population will eventually migrate
or migration will not occur in the ﬁrst place. In contrast, the stock model
predicts that migration ceases when the beneﬁts of migration equal the costs
to the marginal migrant, such that a long-run equilibrium between migration
stocks and expected income emerges. Consequently, migration may cease
despite the existence of large income diﬀerences.International Migration with Heterogeneous Agents 37
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A Appendix
A.1 First-order conditions of the Lagrangian of the mi-
grant's maximisation problem
Deﬁne by L the Lagrangian for the maximisation problem in (3) under the
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where  is the shadow value of wealth.
A.2 Derivatives of the optimal 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Table 1: Panel unit-root tests
total sample European sample non-European sample
without with without with without with
trend trend trend trend trend trend
Breitung t-statistics
lnmstit 8.852 9.637 1.906 1.470 1.748 2.826
∆lnmstit -12.237 ∗∗∗ -14.812 ∗∗∗ -4.579 ∗∗∗ -5.275 ∗∗∗ -6.202 ∗∗∗ -8.259 ∗∗∗
mit -10.160 ∗∗∗ -9.351 ∗∗∗ -2.440 ∗∗∗ -6.888 ∗∗∗ -4.036 ∗∗∗ -13.421 ∗∗∗
lnimit -1.704 ∗∗ -1.083 0.569 1.715 -3.860 ∗∗∗ -5.259 ∗∗∗
∆lnimit -21.505 ∗∗∗ -21.814 ∗∗∗ -5.614 ∗∗∗ -6.133 ∗∗∗ -15.250 ∗∗∗ -20.364 ∗∗∗
lnoutit 0.689 -0.573 0.899 1.033 -3.084 ∗∗∗ -3.482 ∗∗∗
∆lnoutit -21.116 ∗∗∗ -23.699 ∗∗∗ -4.661 ∗∗∗ -5.311 ∗∗∗ -11.747 ∗∗∗ -12.494 ∗∗∗
ln
wft
wit 4.864 11.356 0.711 3.385 1.035 -0.282
∆ln
wft
wit -15.867 ∗∗∗ -14.016 ∗∗∗ -8.882 ∗∗∗ -7.416 ∗∗∗ -9.193 ∗∗∗ -10.003 ∗∗∗
lnwit 4.864 11.356 0.711 3.385 1.035 -0.282
∆lnwit -15.867 ∗∗∗ -14.016 ∗∗∗ -8.882 ∗∗∗ -7.416 ∗∗∗ -9.193 ∗∗∗ -10.003 ∗∗∗
Im-Peseran-Shin ¯ z~ t-statistics
lneit 0.645 0.260 1.699 0.864 -0.573 0.289
∆lneit -13.907 ∗∗∗ -14.504 ∗∗∗ -10.222 ∗∗∗ -10.429 ∗∗∗ -9.274 ∗∗∗ -10.167 ∗∗∗
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics
lneft -1.719 -4.187 ∗∗ - - - -
∆lneft -4.852 ∗∗∗ -4.919 ∗∗∗ - - - -
Notes: ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-signiﬁcance levels, respectively.– The Breitung test-statis-
tics is based on the standard t-statistics. In the total sample, in each time period the mean of the
observations are substracted from the series in order to mitigate the cross-sectional correlation of the
error terms. In the European and the non-European samples the t-statistics which is robust to cross-
sectional correlation of the error terms is reported. This statistics has an asymptotically normal
distribution if ﬁrst the time dimension of the panel tends to iniﬁntiy followed by the group dimensions
tending to inﬁnity.– The Im-Peseran-Shin test reports the z t-tilde bar statistics which allow that the
panel is unbalanced. The z t-tilde bar statistics assumes that the group dimension tends to inﬁnity. The
number of observations are suﬃcient for the asymptotic normal distribution to hold. In order to mitigate
cross-sectional correlations of the error terms, the mean of the observations are substracted from the
series in each time period.– The signiﬁcance levels of the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test are based on
the MacKinnon critical values.Tables 44
Table 2: Westerlund’s test for panel cointegration
total sample European sample non-European sample
Value Z-statistic Value Z-statistic Value Z-statistic
Model with GDP per worker and German employment rate
G -2.838 -5.966 ∗∗∗ -3.626 -7.846 ∗∗∗ -2.138 -0.803
P -18.498 -5.487 ∗∗∗ -18.282 -8.179 ∗∗∗ -10.531 -1.682 ∗∗
Model with GDP per worker, German and home employment rate
G -2.373 -1.115 -2.919 -3.47 ∗∗∗ -1.537 2.759
P -16.545 -3.561 ∗∗∗ -14.694 -4.481 ∗∗∗ -5.101 2.358Tables 45
Table 3: Estimation results: total sample
model (1) model (2) model (3)
Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
lnmsti;t−1 -0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.017 ∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.013 ∗∗ 0.005
ln
wft
wit 0.231 ∗∗∗ 0.055 0.367 ∗∗∗ 0.057 0.414 ∗∗∗ 0.051
lnwi;t−1 0.172 ∗∗∗ 0.054 0.314 ∗∗∗ 0.057 0.324 ∗∗∗ 0.049
lnef;t−1 2.372 ∗∗∗ 0.233 2.393 ∗∗∗ 0.230 2.293 ∗∗∗ 0.196
lnei;t−1 -0.250 ∗∗∗ 0.066
FREEi;t−1 0.034 ∗∗ 0.017 0.014 0.012
IRONi;t−1 -0.111 ∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.060 ∗∗∗ 0.020
DICTi;t−1 0.021 0.015 0.099 ∗∗∗ 0.015
WARi;t−1 0.134 ∗∗∗ 0.034 -0.036 0.035
ASY Li;t−1 -0.058 ∗∗∗ 0.009 -0.033 ∗∗∗ 0.007
∆lnmsti;t−1 0.479 ∗∗∗ 0.017 0.481 ∗∗∗ 0.017 0.502 ∗∗∗ 0.020
∆ln
wft
wit 0.089 0.216 0.441 ∗∗ 0.219 1.171 ∗∗∗ 0.187
∆lnwit -0.086 0.217 0.318 0.221 0.643 ∗∗∗ 0.188
∆lneft 0.804 ∗∗∗ 0.273 0.902 ∗∗∗ 0.272 1.146 ∗∗∗ 0.226
∆lneit -0.220 0.134
∆FREEit 0.023 0.047 0.012 0.031
∆IRONit -0.276 ∗∗∗ 0.060 -0.323 ∗∗∗ 0.048
∆DICTit 0.055 0.037 0.100 ∗∗∗ 0.028
∆WARit 0.100 ∗∗∗ 0.030 -0.009 0.013
∆ASY Lft 0.011 0.016 0.040 ∗∗∗ 0.003
obs. 2091 2091 1319
groups 51 51 41
balanced panel yes yes no
R2 0.38 0.42 0.50
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote the 1%-, 5%- and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.– The
dependent variable is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of the migration stock, ∆lnmstit
normalized by the sending country population.– All regressions are estimated by
weighted OLS, using the log of the population size as weights.–All Regressions
include a dummy variable which controls for a statistical break in the time series
in 1987.– The F(50, 2031) test statistic for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects is 3.06∗∗∗
in the ﬁrst, the F(50,2021) test statistic is 3.77∗∗∗ in the second, and the F(40, 1256)
is 7.05∗∗∗ in the third regression, which rejects the H0 of no country-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects at the 1%-level.Tables 46
Table 4: Regression results: European and non-European samples
European sample non-European sample
Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
lnmsti;t−1 -0.013 ∗∗ 0.006 -0.014 ∗ 0.007 -0.017 ∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.037 ∗∗∗ 0.009
ln
wft
wit 0.436 ∗∗∗ 0.077 0.421 ∗∗∗ 0.069 0.436 ∗∗∗ 0.08 0.409 ∗∗∗ 0.078
lnwi;t−1 0.226 ∗∗∗ 0.070 0.243 ∗∗∗ 0.064 0.396 ∗∗∗ 0.08 0.417 ∗∗∗ 0.076
lnef;t−1 1.963 ∗∗∗ 0.282 2.038 ∗∗∗ 0.261 2.738 ∗∗∗ 0.34 3.383 ∗∗∗ 0.305
lnei;t−1 -0.373 ∗∗∗ 0.088 -0.192 ∗∗ 0.091
FREEi;t−1 0.012 0.015 0.001 0.013
IRONi;t−1 -0.049 ∗∗∗ 0.018 -0.024 0.023
DICTi;t−1 0.107 ∗∗∗ 0.019 0.121 ∗∗∗ 0.018 -0.044 ∗∗ 0.02 0.027 0.034
WARi;t−1 -0.160 ∗∗∗ 0.061 -0.151 ∗∗∗ 0.053 0.191 ∗∗∗ 0.04 0.027 0.062
ASY Lf;t−1 -0.041 ∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.019 ∗ 0.010 -0.065 ∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.010 0.015
∆lnmsti;t−1 0.479 ∗∗∗ 0.521 0.025 0.474 ∗∗∗ 0.02 0.455 ∗∗∗ 0.029
∆ln
wft
wit 0.768 ∗∗∗ 0.274 1.023 ∗∗∗ 0.248 0.326 0.32 1.748 ∗∗∗ 0.256
∆lnwi;t−1 0.142 0.274 0.197 0.247 0.248 0.33 1.538 ∗∗∗ 0.259
∆lnef;t−1 0.784 ∗∗ 0.332 1.181 ∗∗∗ 0.306 1.102 ∗∗∗ 0.41 1.561 ∗∗∗ 0.328
∆lnei;t−1 -0.259 0.204 -0.075 0.156
∆FREEi;t−1 0.010 0.039 0.005 0.033
∆IRONi;t−1 -0.224 ∗∗∗ 0.050 -0.296 ∗∗∗ 0.052
∆DICTi;t−1 0.102 ∗∗ 0.041 0.106 ∗∗∗ 0.035 -0.034 0.06 0.053 0.049
∆WARi;t−1 -0.077 0.069 -0.088 0.059 0.123 ∗∗∗ 0.04 0.037 0.042
∆ASY Lf;t−1 0.018 0.020 0.034 ∗∗ 0.017 0.016 0.02 0.078 ∗∗∗ 0.017
obs. 984 869 1107 450
groups 24 24 27 18
balanced
panel yes no yes no
R2 0.46 0.51 0.44 0.58
Notes: ***, **, * denote the 1%-, 5%- and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.– The dependent
variable is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of the migration stock, d ln mst it, normalized by the
home country population.– All regressions are estimated by weightes OLS, using the log of the
population size as weights.–All Regressions include a dummy variable which control for a statis-
tical break in the time series in 1987.– The F(23,941) statistic testing for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects is 3.33∗∗∗ in the ﬁrst, the F(23,824) statistic is 4.26∗∗∗ in the second, the F(26,1065) sta-
tistics is 3.88∗∗∗ in the third, and the F(17,415) statistic is 8.03∗∗∗, which rejects the H0 of no)
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects at the 1%-level in all regressions.Tables 47
Table 5: List of variables
mstit Foreign population from country i in Germany as a percentage of sending
country population. Source: StatistischesBundesamt (2010a).
mit Net migration ﬂow from country i into Germany as a percentage of sending
country population. Source: StatistischesBundesamt (2010b).
imit Gross migration inﬂow from country i into Germany as a percentage of sending
country population. Source: StatistischesBundesamt (2010b).
outit Gross migration outﬂow from country i into Germany as a percentage of sending
country population. Source: StatistischesBundesamt (2010b).
wft
wit Ratio of the GDP per worker of Germany to the GDP per worker of sending
country i measured in PPP. Sources:
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009), World Bank (2010), OECD (2010).
wit GDP per worker of sending country i measured in PPP. Sources:
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009), World Bank (2010), OECD (2010).
eft Employment rate of Germany in % (100 minus the unemployment rate in %).
OECD (2010), World Bank (2010).
eit Employment rate of sending country in % (100 minus the unemployment rate in %).
OECD (2010), World Bank (2010).
FREEit Dummy variable for participation of country i in the free movement of the
European Common Market. Source: Own compilation.
IRONit Dummy variable for emigration barriers in country i during the ’Iron Curtain’
period. Source: Own compilation.
DICTit Dummy variable for dictatorship in country i. Source: Own compilation based on
FreedomHouse (2008).
WARit Dummy variable for war in country i. Source: Own compilation.
ASY Lft Dummy variable for the asylum restrictions introduced in Germany from 1992
onwards. Source: Own compilation.Tables 48
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
mstit 2193 0.428 0.779 0.000 4.565
lnmstit 2193 -2.329 1.990 -9.915 1.518
mit 2193 0.012 0.071 -0.611 1.122
imit 2193 0.056 0.114 0.000 1.696
lnimit 2193 -4.221 1.868 -12.946 0.528
outit 2193 0.044 0.081 0.000 0.847
lnoutit 2193 -4.555 2.000 -13.445 -0.166
wft
wit 2193 4.777 6.225 0.541 49.249
ln
wft
wit 2193 1.022 0.974 -0.615 3.897
wit 2193 20440 15268 968 64918
lnwit 2193 9.542 0.986 6.876 11.081
eft 51 94.02 3.02 88.85 99.43
lneft 51 4.543 0.032 4.487 4.599
eit 1379 92.77 5.39 69.00 99.94
lneit 1379 4.528 0.061 4.234 4.605